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INTRODUCTION

John Dalberg-Acton famously proclaimed that, “[p]ower tends to
1
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Former Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich, acting under state law to appoint a
replacement to fill a vacant seat in the United States Senate, infamously
quipped that such a seat is “a fucking valuable thing, you just don’t give
2
it away for nothing.” In Springfield, Illinois, in late 2008, Governor
Blagojevich was John Dalberg-Acton’s word made flesh. The procedure
followed by Illinois to fill a vacant Senate seat — to vest all of the
3
power in the governor — is not only a policy filled with potential
abuses and shortcomings, but also a policy followed by far too many
states. Governors have acted under the color of similar laws numerous
times over the past decade in ways that cast doubt on the legitimacy of
government. It is time to end this policy.
The seat in Illinois was not the only senatorial office vacated
following the 2008 election. While Barack Obama and Joe Biden
resigned from the Senate to serve as President and Vice President,
respectively, two other senators left office to accept positions in
4
Obama’s Cabinet. In total, since June 4, 2007, nine senators have left
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science,
Drew University, magna cum laude, 2008. I would like to thank Professor Alexander, for
his tremendous help and wisdom; Drew Univ. Professors Romance & Mundo, for making
me a better writer and student of politics; and my family, for their love and support.
1
JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG-ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364
(1948).
2
Complaint at 56, United States v. Blagojevich, 08 CR 888 (N.D. Ill. 2008), available
at www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1209_01a.pdf [hereinafter “Complaint”].
3
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2010).
4
Obama was replaced by Roland Burris. Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Gov. Rod
Blagojevich Picks Former Attorney General to Replace Obama, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec.
31, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-blagojevich-burris-senate-31dec31
,0,2666580.story. Ted Kaufman was appointed to Biden’s seat. Jeff Montgomery, Longtime
Aide Ted Kaufman to Fill Biden’s Senate Seat, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2008,
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5

office during the middle of their term. In all of these instances, state
law has determined how the seat is to be filled. As highlighted by the
Blagojevich scandal, these laws are far from perfect.
On January 19, 2010, Scott Brown, a Republican from
Massachusetts, won a special election to serve out the remainder of the
6
late Edward “Ted” Kennedy’s senate term. His election had a national
impact, as he became the forty-first Republican in the Senate, ending
7
the Democrats’ filibuster-proof “super-majority.” For nearly a year,
building off of the momentum of having a “super-majority,” the
8
Democrats had been calling for major healthcare reform. With Brown’s
election, pundits suddenly declared moot the months-long healthcare
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-11-24-minner-biden_N.htm. Hillary Clinton
left her New York seat to serve as Secretary of State, and was replaced by Kristin
Gillibrand. Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Picks Gillibrand for Senate
Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com
/2009/01/24/nyregion/24senator.html. Finally, Ken Salazar of Colorado resigned to serve as
the Secretary of the Interior ande was replaced by Michael Bennet. Karen Crummy, Ritter
Taps Bennet as Senator, DENVER POST, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com
/breakingnews/ci_11355396.
5
See Crummy, supra note 4 (Salazar (CO)); Hakim & Confessore, supra note 4
(Clinton (NY)); Montgomery, supra note 4 (Biden (DE)); Pearson & Long, supra note 4
(Obama (IL). Further, Craig Thomas (WY) passed away on June 4, 2007, and was replaced
by John Barrasso. Rita Healy & P.G. Sittenfeld, Wyoming’s New Senator, TIME, June 22,
2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1636439,00.html. Next, Trent Lott
(MS) resigned to work in the private sector, and Roger Wicker was appointed to fill his
vacant seat. Adam Nossiter, Congressman Named to Fill Lott’s Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/washington/01senator.html. Mel
Martinez (FL) also resigned from the Senate and was replaced by George LeMiuex. Adam
C. Smith, Gov. Charlie Crist Places a Bet on Loyalty by Appointing George LeMieux, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/state/no-onewas-a-safer-choice-than-george-lemieux-but-time-will-tell-if/1031984. Following the death
of Edward “Ted” Kennedy (MA), Paul Kirk was temporarily appointed to the seat, before
Scott Brown won a special election. Paul Kane & Karl Vick, Republican Brown Beats
Coakley in Special Senate Election in Massachusetts, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/19/AR2010011904517.
html. Finally, Sen. Robert Byrd (WV) died on June 28, 2010. Adam Clymer, Robert Byrd, A
Pillar of the Senate, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/06/29/us/politics/29byrd.html.
6
Kane & Vick, supra note 5.
7
David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats May Seek to Push Health Bill
Through House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/health
/policy/19health.html.
8
Robert Pear & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says He Is Open to Altering Health Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/us/politics/06webhealth.html. On March 5, 2009, the forty-fifth day of his Administration, President Obama
hosted a “healthcare summit.” Id.
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debate, which had been one of the top stories of the year, as the
Republicans could now prevent a bill from coming to a vote by
10
blocking a motion for cloture. Mara Liasson, a National Public Radio
correspondent, captured the general consensus following the election
when she stated, “[w]ell, a lot has happened since [Brown won].
Obviously health care was about to pass. Everybody here at this table
11
and [in Washington, D.C.] felt that way. No longer.” This drastic
change on Capitol Hill occurred because of the vacancy in one Senate
seat. It is apparent from this reaction that senators are important people,
and that one vacancy can have a major impact on the national political
landscape. Based on the number of senators that have left office early
over the past few years, and the importance of the office, the time is ripe
for state legislatures to reexamine the laws on the books, and to craft
Senate succession laws that best encapsulate key public policy
considerations.
The uniform law proposed in this Note recognizes that Senate
succession laws should seek to advance four goals: (1) placing a check
on the governor’s power; (2) ensuring legitimacy in the process; (3)
guaranteeing that a state is not underrepresented in the Senate for a
prolonged period of time; and, (4) seeking a fair result. It is important to
place a check on the governor’s power because the Framers founded the
12
United States government on a system of checks and balances. Further,
without placing a check on the governor’s power, a state is inviting the
type of abuse that occurred in Illinois in 2008. Connected to this is the
9

Top 10 Everything of 2009: The Divisive Debate Over Health Care Reform, TIME,
Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1945379_1944421_1944382,00.html.
10
‘Special Report’ Panel on ‘Scott Brown Effect’ on Health Care Reform, FOX NEWS
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,583661,00.html [hereinafter Scott
Brown Effect].
11
Id.
12
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution.
org/fed/federa51.htm. In this paper, entitled “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the
Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” Madison begins:
To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the
necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the
Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so
contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places.
Id.
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goal of ensuring that the electorate has faith in the legitimacy of the
process. This not only applies to situations where illegal wrongdoing
has occurred, but also to even the hint of a corrupting influence. Such
legal, but questionable, appointments could include a governor
appointing his daughter to the Senate, or a governor appointing his chief
of staff to the office of Senator. When the governor is making an
appointment, he or she is speaking in a situation where the voice of the
public would normally be heard through election. Therefore, it is not
only proper to allow more people to have a say in the process, but it is
important that the people of the state have faith in that process.
Avoiding underrepresentation in the Senate for a prolonged period
of time is another issue that ties in doctrinally to the founding of this
country. Thanks to the Connecticut Compromise, the Senate is the only
13
body in the government where each state has an equal voice. With just
100 members, every senator plays an important role in legislative
action, as recently highlighted by the aftermath of the Scott Brown
14
election. Because the federal government is set up to give each state
equal power in the Senate, it is imperative that a state is fully
represented in that legislative body. Thus, an appointee should fill a
vacant Senate seat as quickly as reasonably possible.
Finally, fairness can be achieved by making sure that the balance
of power in the Senate does not shift solely because one senator is no
longer in office and the governor appointing the replacement identifies
with a different political party. As the election of Scott Brown makes
clear, the balance of power in the Senate can be altered when just one
seat “flips” from being held by one party to another. It would be
inequitable for such a shift in the national political landscape to occur
simply because one senator resigned or passed away, and the governor
in his state appointed a replacement from a different political party.
Party continuity is therefore a way to assure a fair result when
appointing someone to serve out the remainder of another’s term.
The law in forty states calls for the governor to have full discretion,
15
without condition, to fill a vacancy in the Senate. These laws defy
13

Alec MacGillis, Gangs of D.C., WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2009, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/07/AR2009080702045.html.
14
Scott Brown Effect, supra note 10.
15
ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011);
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO
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fundamental principles of fairness, legitimacy, and checks on power.
Other states hold a special election to be held to fill the vacancy, but
these laws leave the state underrepresented in the Senate for too long.
The best solution is one that checks the governor’s power while also
assuring a fair and just result not only for voters within the state, but for
all Americans.
This Note, therefore, proposes a law that draws from the various
laws of the fifty states. Although the ultimate decision should be vested
with the governor, he or she should choose from one of three candidates
nominated by the state committee of the political party to which the
former senator belonged at the time he or she left office. This proposed
law would also have special stipulations for senators not registered to a
party. The proposed legislation also assures that the balance of the
Senate will not shift based on the political affiliation of the governor,
while also foreclosing opportunities for corruption and assuring that the
people of the state are not left without full representation in Washington
for an extended period of time.
Before states pass a new law, however, there must be a realization
that the current system is flawed. Instead of balancing the key policy
considerations set forth above, it appears that state legislatures have
been comfortable with the quid pro quo of politics — to the victor goes
the spoils. Recognizing the shortcomings of this policy will pave the
way to reform.
In 1881, President James A. Garfield was assassinated by Charles

CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002,
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3-10-3 (West 2011).
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J. Guiteau, who was upset that the President did not give him a job in
return for campaigning on Garfield’s behalf at the Republican National
16
Convention. At the time, the common practice — dubbed the “spoils
system” — was for the winning public official to give nearly all of the
17
government jobs to loyal members of his party. Following Garfield’s
assassination, Congress passed the Pendleton Act to reform the
18
patronage system. Over the years, the law has been strengthened and
reformed to the point where over ninety percent of government jobs are
19
secure from one election to another.
Hopefully the Blagojevich scandal is the tipping point in the call to
reform Senate succession laws, much like Garfield’s assassination led to
the reform of civil service jobs. In both instances, the quid pro quo of
the day is not in the best interest of the people. At present, state
legislatures are either ignoring key policy considerations, or do not
realize what they are doing by employing the laws that are currently on
the books. Instead of giving governors so much power, it is necessary
for state legislatures to balance the interests at stake, and to reform the
law accordingly.
Part II of this Note examines the current state laws that are
employed to determine how to fill a vacant Senate seat. Part III looks at
the problems that arise when a state vests unchecked power in the
governor, as is the current practice in forty states. Part IV highlights the
potential pitfalls of calling for a special election to fill the vacancy. An
alternate proposal is put forth in Part V of this Note, while the reality of
how difficult it would be to implement such reform is addressed in Part
VI.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF LAW

The laws governing Senate succession can be separated into three
groups. First, the law in forty states provides the governor with absolute
16
Charles Guiteau Collection: GEORGETOWN U. LIBR., http://www.library.georgetown.
edu/dept/speccoll/cl133.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
17
Andrew Jackson: Good, Evil & The Presidency, Special Features, The Spoils System,
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kcet/andrewjackson/features/the_spoils_system.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that it was United States Senator William L. Marcy who first said,
following the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson, that, “to the victor belongs the spoils[.]”).
18
Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (current version in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
19
Pendleton Act (1883), U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.our
documents.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=48(last visited Mar. 11 2011).
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20

authority to appoint a new senator in the event of a vacancy. These
laws also require the governor to call for a special election within two
21
years of that appointment. The second group consists of six states that
22
take the opposite approach, vesting no power in the governor. Instead,
23
these states require the vacancy to be filled by a special election.
Although there is no uniform requirement, states generally hold these
24
elections three to four months after the seat is vacated. This leaves the
final group, which consists of four states that have taken unique
approaches to Senate succession laws.
The first of these four states is Arizona, whose statute calls for the
governor to appoint a replacement when a Senator vacates his or her
25
seat prematurely. The power is qualified, however, by the requirement
that the “appointee shall be of the same political party as the person
26
vacating the office[.]” This law provides little guidance to the
governor, and could potentially be an invitation for abuse. The
foundation upon which the law rests is not faulty, but could be written
more concisely. Three states have enacted laws that avoid such
27
vagueness — Hawai’i, Utah, and Wyoming.
In the event of a vacancy in the Senate, Wyoming law calls for the
state political party that the senator represented at the time of his or her
28
election to nominate three potential replacements to the governor. The
governor then has the sole power to appoint the replacement from this
29
group. Once the governor names a replacement, a special election
30
occurs within two years. In the event that the senator was not a
registered member of a political party at the time of his or her election,
the law calls for each party registered in the state to nominate one

20

E.g.,N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
Id.
22
ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011).
23
E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145.
24
Id.
25
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-222 (LexisNexis 2011).
26
Id.
27
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1(LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502
(West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011).
28
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i).
29
Id.
30
Id.
21
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31

person. Any individual not registered with a political party may enter
his or her name for consideration, provided a petition with 100
signatures to the Wyoming Secretary of State accompanies their
32
application. The governor is then presented with the names of all of the
candidates, and is vested with the power to fill the vacancy from that
33
list.
Utah and Hawai’i have similar laws. Utah law calls for the
governor to choose from one of three candidates “nominated by the
state central committee of the same political party as the prior
34
officeholder.” Utah law does not, however, have a provision that
governs how to fill a vacancy if the exiting senator was not registered
with a political party. The law in Hawai’i is similar, providing that the
governor should make an appointment “from a list of three prospective
appointees submitted by the same political party as the prior
35
incumbent.” In the event that the previous legislator was an
independent, the law states that “the Governor shall appoint a person
who is not and has not been, for at least six months immediately prior to
36
the appointment, a member of any political party.”
III. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE WHEN POWER IS VESTED
SOLELY IN THE GOVERNOR
A.

Shifting the Balance of Power in the United States Senate

Forty states vest the governor with the unchecked power to appoint
37
a replacement to the United States Senate. Although these laws achieve
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502 (West 2010).
35
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
36
Id.
37
ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011);
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO
CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT.
32
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the state’s goal of being fully represented in Washington for as long as
possible, placing such great power in the hands of one elected official
runs contrary to the goals of fairness, placing a check on power, and
ensuring legitimacy. If the exiting senator and the current governor are
members of different political parties, then it seems almost inevitable
that the Senate seat will change party hands. In a legislative body that is
limited to 100 members, such a transformation could shift the balance
of power. In any given situation, a vacant senate seat could give rise to
the breaking of a 50-50 deadlock, the elimination of a 51-49 majority,
or the end of a “super-majority.” Needless to say, this is not the proper
avenue by which to achieve a change in the power structure of the
Senate.
This concern is legitimate, especially considering the recent
makeup of the Senate. On January 2, 2001, a day before the 107th
Congress first convened, the Senate was evenly split with fifty
38
Democrats and fifty Republicans. Two years later, when the 108th
Congress met for the first time, the Republicans held a slim 51-48-1
majority, with the lone independent, Senator James Jeffords (VT),
39
caucusing with the Democrats. Further, the 110th Congress — which
was in session from January 2007 through January 2009 — began with
40
the Democrats holding onto a 49-49-2 “majority;” both independent

CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002,
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3-10-3 (West 2011).
38
Alan Fram, Power-Sharing Divides Evenly Split 107th, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2001),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=122135&page=1 (noting that a series of events
unfolded over the two years while the 107th Congress was in session, ultimately resulting in
a Republican majority, 51-48-1).
39
MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21379, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 108TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2004), available at, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
resources/pdf/RS21379.pdf; Brian Knowlton, Switch by Jeffords Would Give 51-to-49
Majority to Democrats: Senator Set to Defect From the Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/24/news/24iht-jefford_ed3_.html. .
40
MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22555, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 110TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/
resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf.
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Senators, Joseph Liebermann (CT) and Bernie Sanders (VT), caucused
41
with the Democrats. Finally, during the 111th Congress the Democrats
held the coveted 60-40 “super majority,” allowing them to prevent a
42
filibuster if the interests of all of the Democrat Senators aligned. A
year into the congressional term, however, the Democrats’ majority fell
to 59-41, after Scott Brown, a Republican, won a special election in
43
Massachusetts following the death of Senator Kennedy, a Democrat.
Therefore, in four of the past five sessions of Congress, the balance of
power not only could have shifted if one senator were to leave office,
but the death of a senator and the law used to fill his remaining term
actually did impact the balance of power.
During the 110th Congress, the Democrats missed an opportunity
44
to gain an extra seat because of the law in place in Wyoming. The
Democrats began the 110th Congress with a 49-49-2 “majority.” On
June 4, 2007, Republican Senator Craig Thomas (WY) passed away
45
after a long battle with leukemia. If Wyoming were one of the forty
states that vests sole authority in appointing a replacement with the
46
governor, it is likely that the Democrats would have gained an extra
47
seat because Dave Freudenthal, a Democrat, was governor at the time.
However, as mentioned, Wyoming law prevents a political party from
48
capitalizing on such an unfortunate situation. Thus, the Wyoming
Republican Party presented Governor Freudenthal with a list of three
nominees, and he selected John Barrasso from the list to serve as the
49
state’s junior senator.
In the current era of politics, where tremendous emphasis is placed
41
David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Address Their Own Rifts on Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/health/policy
/16health.html [hereinafter Democratic Rifts on Health Care]; Paul Kane & Shailagh
Murray, Senate Democrats Allow Lieberman to Retain Key Chairmanship, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/
AR2008111800231.html.
42
Monica Davey & Carl Hulse, Franken’s Win Bolsters Democratic Grip in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/politics/01minnesota
.html.
43
Kane & Vick, supra note 5.
44
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011).
45
Rita Healy & P.G. Sittenfeld, Wyoming’s New Senator, TIME, June 22, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1636439,00.html.
46
E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011) .
47
Healy & Sittenfeld, supra note 45.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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on which states are “blue” and which states are “red,” it is easy to think
that the political climate of a state is defined by a color. As it turns out,
the party affiliation of a state’s governor and two senators cannot easily
be ascertained based on how a state voted in the last Presidential
election. Currently, there are thirty-one senators who serve twenty-five
states where the governor has a party affiliation that differs from their
50
own. As such, if hypothetical Senator A from State One were to leave
office tomorrow, there is nearly one out of three odds that the Governor
51
of State One has a different political party affiliation than Senator A. A
vast majority of states are ignoring the issue of fairness that arises in
this situation.
B.

Unelected Governors

While interests of legitimacy, fairness, and placing a check on
power are already being ignored when a state gives the governor
unchecked power to fill a senate vacancy, these interests are heightened
when the governor is not actually elected to the state’s highest office.
There are two different scenarios that could give rise to such a situation:
(1) when the new governor was elected lieutenant governor and
succeeded the former governor from that position; or, (2) if the state
does not have a lieutenant governor’s office and the new executive was
not elected statewide. The latter scenario is the more likely of the two to
raise additional concerns about the appointment.
i.

Lieutenant Governors

If a state has a lieutenant governor, the concern over the legitimacy
of an appointment made by an unelected governor is mitigated. At the
federal level, the vice president has ascended to the presidency on eight
50

Compare Governor Roster 2011, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/GOVLIST.PDF, with Senators of the 112th Congress, U.S.
SENATE, http://senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm (last visited Mar.
13, 2011).
51
It is important to note that it is “different party affiliation,” because it cannot be
assumed that one is a Democrat, the other a Republican. For example, Connecticut’s
Governor is a Republican, while one of its Senators, Richard Blumenthal, is a Democrat,
and the other, Joseph Lieberman, an independent. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 50;
U.S SENATE, supra note 50. Similarly, Senator Bernie Sanders from Vermont is an
independent who serves alongside Senator Leahy, a Democrat, while Vermont is governed
by a Democrat. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 50; U.S SENATE, supra note 50.
Because the issue of senators without a party affiliation will be addressed later, this
distinction is necessary. See infra Part V(B).
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occasions following the death of the president, and once following a
52
resignation. Fighting over the legitimacy of the Administration of a
53
former vice president was John Tyler’s cross to bear. It is now a long
established norm that a vice president or lieutenant governor can ascend
54
to the executive office.
The most recent example of a lieutenant governor ascending to the
office of governor, and then having the responsibility of appointing a
55
senator, occurred in New York in 2009. After Governor Elliot
Spitzer’s resignation following a sex scandal, David Paterson rose from
56
lieutenant governor to governor. Paterson was then responsible, under
57
New York law, for appointing a replacement for Senator Hillary
Clinton, who resigned to serve as Secretary of State in the Obama
58
Administration.
Governor Paterson selected United States
59
Representative Kristen Gillibrand to fill the vacancy. Concerns of the
electorate losing faith in the system in this situation are mitigated
because Paterson was elected to the lieutenant governor position with
the understanding that he may one day have to exercise the powers of
the governor. By implementing a law that calls for the governor’s
successor to be voted into office at the statewide level, the New York
60
Legislature found a way to protect the process. There are states,
52
Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate), U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm#4 (last
visited Mar. 13, 2011).
53
John Tyler became the first Vice President to assume the Office of the President
following the death of his predecessor (William Henry Harrison). John Tyler, THE WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johntyler (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
Dubbed “His Accidency,” it was unclear at the time whether it was proper for Tyler to
assume the full powers of an elected President. Id.
54
Id.
55
Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Picks Gillibrand for Senate Seat,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/nyregion/24senator.html.
56
Nicholas Confessore, Paterson Is Sworn In As Governor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/nyregion/17cnd-paterson.html.
57
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
58
Hakim & Confessore, supra note 55.
59
Id.
60
This process includes more than just exercising the appointment power when a seat in
the United States Senate has been vacated. Governors sign legislation into law and make
numerous appointments — for various boards or local judgeships — on a weekly basis. By
having a lieutenant governor office, some states have assured the integrity of all of these
acts. It should be noted, however, that when exercising the appointment power when a
Senate seat is vacated, the governor is being asked to substitute his or her own opinion for
the will of the electorate (as opposed to when the governor appoints a local judge). Thus, the
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however, that have failed to make such a value judgment, and have thus
exposed themselves to situations where the legitimacy of an unelected
governor exercising the appointment power could be called into
question.
ii.

States without a Lieutenant Governor Office

There are currently seven states that do not have an office of
61
lieutenant governor. These states instead call for the senate president,
attorney general, or secretary of state to succeed the governor in the
62
event that the governor vacates the office. If such an official were to
rise to the office of governor and be charged with filling a vacant senate
seat, unique issues would arise.
The political scandal that rocked New Jersey in 2004 illustrates the
potential problem. Following the resignation of Governor James
McGreevey, New Jersey Senate President Richard Codey served as the
63
acting governor for fifteen months. Had a United States Senate seat
been vacated during that time, Governor Codey would have had
unchecked power to appoint a replacement to serve the people of New
64
Jersey. Governor Codey possessed such power despite the fact that the
electorate in only one of New Jersey’s forty state senate districts voted
65
him into office. Despite his high approval ratings as governor, the
people of New Jersey, as a whole, never elected him to serve in any
66
office, let alone the state’s highest executive office. Instead, essentially
two and a half percent of the people had the opportunity to vote for him
in his state senate election. Regardless of this discrepancy, New Jersey
law would have authorized him to speak for the people of New Jersey
with respect to the person they wished to serve them in Washington.
concerns over legitimacy are necessarily heightened.
61
These seven states are: Arizona, Maine, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Roster of Lieutenant Governors/NLGA Members, NAT’L
LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS ASS’N, , http://www.nlga.us/web-content/LtGovernors/LG_Roster
.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
62
Id.
63
No Special Election to Replace McGreevey, MSNBC (Sept. 15, 2004, 6:31PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6012950.
64
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011).
65
Districts by Number, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/
districts/districtnumbers.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
66
On January 31, 2005, Governor Codey enjoyed a seventy-six percent approval rating.
Did Codey Back Out Too Soon?, THE STAR-LEDGER/EAGLETON-RUTGERS POLL (Feb. 7,
2005), http://slerp.rutgers.edu/retrieve.php?id=152-2.
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The concerns over legitimacy that were foreclosed by allowing an
elected lieutenant governor like David Paterson to fill a vacancy
reemerge when the governor appointing a replacement has not won a
statewide election.
New Jersey is no longer one of the seven states without an office of
lieutenant governor. On November 8, 2005, exactly fifty-one weeks
after Governor Codey took office from the embattled Governor
67
McGreevey, the voters of New Jersey passed a state constitutional
68
amendment creating the lieutenant governor office. In New Jersey, the
people were able to safeguard the process by voting to have a statewide
election for the governor’s successor. While suggesting that the
remaining seven states add a lieutenant governor office is beyond the
scope of this proposal, stripping one person of the absolute power to
appoint a senator is another way to safeguard the process, as well as
mitigate questions about the legitimacy of the appointment.
C.

Conflicts of Interest

By endorsing the political quid pro quo and vesting the
appointment power solely in one person’s hands, state legislatures have
passively endorsed situations where the governor is clearly torn between
self-interest and the interests of the state. This is not a situation unique
in the appointment of a senator, as governors are asked to appoint
people to numerous positions, from judges to members of a board or
committee. However, in the situation of appointing a senator, the
governor is substituting his or her own judgment in a situation where
the electorate normally has the opportunity to speak. Twice in the past
decade a governor, acting with unchecked power, has, it appears, been
able to place his interests above that of the state.
i.

Florida Governor Charlie Crist’s Conundrum

On December 2, 2008, Senator Mel Martinez (FL) announced that
69
he would not seek reelection in November 2010. By May 12, 2009,
Florida Governor Charlie Crist, widely considered a rising star in the
Republican Party, announced that he would not run for reelection,
67

No Special Election to Replace McGreevey, supra note 63.
New Jersey Lieutenant Governor, EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS AT RUTGERS U.,
http://www.njvoterinfo.org/lieutenantgov.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
69
Chris Cillizza, Mel Martinez to Retire, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2008,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/senate/mel-martinez-to-retire.html.
68
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70

instead opting to seek Martinez’s seat in 2010. On August 7, 2009,
Senator Martinez announced that he was resigning before the end of his
71
term. Crist was then charged with appointing a replacement under
72
Florida law. Clearly, there was a natural tension between doing what
was in the best interests of the people of Florida and what Governor
Crist needed to do to further his own political ambitions. In the end,
Crist appointed a man he knew would warm the seat for him and would
73
not seek reelection in 2010: his former chief of staff, George LeMieux.
74
With a political system built on placing a check on power, it
seems unfathomable that an overwhelming majority of state legislatures
would foster an environment where such conflicts of interest can occur.
Yet, such a framework is in place as a result of laws in states like
Florida, which ignore the interests of the citizens in believing in the
legitimacy of the process, opting instead to allow the quid pro quo of
state politics to rule the day.
ii.

Alaska 2002: Keeping it in the Family

On November 5, 2002, United States Senator Frank Murkowski
75
was elected Governor of Alaska. Pursuant to Alaska law, one of his
76
very first tasks was selecting a replacement for his seat on Capitol Hill.
Governor Murkowski selected a former Anchorage District Attorney
who had served two terms in the Alaska State House: his daughter, Lisa

70

Damien Cave & Gary Fineout, Restless in Tallahassee, or With Eye on 2012,
Governor Rolls Dice, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/13/us/13cristq.html.
71
Aaron Deslatte & Josh Hafenbrack, Sen. Mel Martinez’s Exit Kicks Ball to Crist,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug 8, 2009, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/local
/breakingnews/orl-mel-martinez-resigns-080709,0,2817086.story.
72
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011).
73
Josh Hafenbrack, Gov. Crist Picks George LeMieux to Replace Mel Martinez as
Florida’s Senator, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.orlandosentinel.com
/news/local/seminole/orl-crist-picks-sentator-replacement-martinez-0828,0,3403253.story?
track=rss; Adam C. Smith, Gov. Charlie Crist Places a Bet on Loyalty by Appointing
George LeMieux, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009, http://www.tampabay.com
/news/politics/state/no-one-was-a-safer-choice-than-george-lemieux-but-time-will-tellif/1031984.
74
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), available at http://www.constitution.org
/fed/federa51.htm.
75
Jill Lawrence, Career Politician to Head Home State, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2002-11-06-murkowski_x.htm.
76
ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (20011).
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77

Murkowski. Two years later, the people of Alaska voted Ballot
Initiative #4 into law, which stripped the governor of such power,
78
opting instead to call for a special election. It would appear the people
of Alaska doubted the process by which Governor Murkowski made the
appointment. By reforming the law through a ballot measure, Alaskans
were able to establish a safeguard so that their interest in the legitimacy
of the process would not be ignored again.
The problem with Alaska’s Ballot Initiative #4 is that it is
reactionary. Currently, forty states are prone to such potential conflicts
79
of interest. In the same election where Alaskans voted Ballot Initiative
#4 into law, they elected Lisa Murkowski to serve a full term on Capitol
80
81
Hill. Alaskan voters (perhaps tacitly) approved of Governor Frank
Murkowski’s appointee, but they disapproved of the process used to
first seat her.
D.

The Power of Incumbency

The laws in the forty states that provide the governor with the sole
authority to fill a vacancy in the Senate require a special election to be
82
called within two years of the appointment. Therefore, the governor’s
appointee will not necessarily serve the duration of the term. Yet, as the
2004 election in Alaska demonstrates, these senators may not be voted
out of office merely because the electorate disapproves of the manner in
77
Katharine Q. Seelye, New Alaska Governor Gives Daughter His Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/us/new-alaska-governor-givesdaughter-his-seat-in-senate.html.
78
Alaska
Election
Results
2004,
WASH.
POST,
Nov.
24,
2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/elections/2004/ak/; Al Grillo, Murkowski Wins
Close Race for Alaska Senate Seat, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com
/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-ak-ussenate-battle_x.htm.
79
E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
80
Grillo, supra note 78.
81
It would be improper to conclude merely from the election results that the people of
Alaska whole-heartedly endorsed the selection of Lisa Murkowski. First, it is important to
note that Alaskans have consistently voted overwhelmingly Republican. In fact, at the time
of the 2004 election, Alaska’s two U.S. Senate seats had been occupied by Republican
lawmakers since 1981. U.S. Senators from Alaska, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/senators/one_item_and_teasers/alaska.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). Second,
the Murkowski “brand” was powerful and popular in Alaska. Frank Murkowski had served
in the Senate since 1981 and had just been elected governor; his political capital could
certainly carry over to his daughter. Id. Third, and tied into that second point, is the power
of incumbency. See infra Part III(D).
82
E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
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83

which they were appointed. The truth is that United States Senators
enjoy an incredibly high retention rate, and the power of incumbency in
84
an election is undeniable. The argument here is not that high retention
rates themselves are bad, but that the decision made by the governor in
this situation, even if later checked by the people through a special
election, has long-lasting and powerful implications. Because of this, it
is important to safeguard the process by which these senators are
appointed.
If incumbency were not such an advantage in an election, the need
to safeguard the process used to fill vacancies would be mitigated, if not
altogether mooted. The reality of Washington, however, is that, on
average, seven out of eight senators up for re-election are sworn into
85
office for another six-year term. There have been eleven bi-annual
Senatorial elections since (and including) 1990, and the average rate of
86
incumbency is an astounding eighty-six and a quarter percent. The
lowest retention rate during that time came in 2006, when the
87
Democrats retook control of the Senate. Still, senators were re-elected
88
that year at a rate of seventy-nine percent. Even the “Republican
Revolution” of 1994 resulted in a ninety-two percent senatorial
89
retention rate. While it is true that forty states call for a special election
after the governor has made his or her appointment, an appointed
senator has an advantage on the ballot.
The aforementioned Senator Kristen Gillibrand (NY), a Democrat,
is a great example of the clout that incumbency carries. In only her
second term as a member of the United States House of
Representatives, Gillibrand would have been a long shot to fill the seat
vacated by Hillary Clinton if there had been an open primary, especially
considering her upstate roots and 100% rating from the National Rifle
90
Association. New York law requires that a special election be called
83

Grillo, supra note 78.
Reelection Rates Over the Years, CENTER. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/reelect.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Mary Lu Carnevale, Paterson’s Choice of Gillibrand Touches Off Chain
Reaction,WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/01/23/patersonschoice-of-gillibrand-touches-off-chain-reaction/.
84
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91

within two years of an appointment, and it appeared early on that the
newly minted senator would face a primary challenge from a member of
the more liberal wing of the party.
United States Representatives Steve Israel and Carolyn B. Maloney
both originally stated that they intended to challenge Senator Gillibrand
92
in a 2010 Democratic Primary. Representative Israel, however,
abandoned his plan to run after President Obama called the
93
Congressman, urging him not to challenge the sitting senator. In a
similar move, Representative Maloney aborted her plans, recognizing
94
the “long odds” she faced in defeating Senator Gillibrand. She made
this decision despite the fact that at that time she was holding an early
95
33-27 lead over Gillibrand in a poll of New York Democrats. As a
result of her newfound status as an incumbent in the Senate, Gillibrand
96
dodged a serious primary challenge. Governor Paterson’s decision
clearly had a long-lasting impact.
E.

The Finality of the Decision

In two separate instances, separated by four decades, voters have
attempted to challenge a governor’s appointment to the Senate in court.
Specifically, voters have challenged the constitutionality of state laws
that vest the appointment power with the governor. The first challenge
came in 1968, following the appointment made after the assassination of
97
Senator Robert Kennedy, while the second came in 2009, after
Governor Blagojevich appointed Roland Burris to fill the remainder of
98
President Obama’s senatorial term. The common thread between the
two judgments is that a decision made by the governor of a state that
provides him or her with full discretion is unquestionably final.
91

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
Raymond Hernandez, Recognizing Long Odds, Maloney Drops Her Senate Bid, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/nyregion/08maloney.html.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Toplines - 2010 New York Democratic Primary for Senate- July 14, 2009,
RASMUSSEN REP. (July 14, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content
/politics/elections/election_2010/election_2010_state_toplines/new_york/toplines_2010_ne
w_york_democratic_primary_for_senate_july_14_2009.
96
Former Congressman Harold Ford, Jr. also mulled a primary challenge, ultimately
deciding against it. Michael Barbaro, Ford Decides Not to Run for Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
March 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/nyregion/02ford.html.
97
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
98
Judge v. Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d 933, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
92

CRAMER (DO NOT DELETE)

462

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
i.

5/5/2011 7:37 PM

Vol. 35:2

Judge v. Quinn

Following then-Governor Rod Blagojevich’s appointment of
Roland Burris to the Senate, a class consisting of Illinois voters brought
99
legal action, seeking an emergency injunction. Blagojevich had made
the appointment despite being indicted on federal charges of corruption
100
after allegedly attempting to sell the open seat. The plaintiff-voters
challenged the constitutionality of the state statute that governs how
101
Senate vacancies are filled. Specifically, they believed the law
102
violated the Seventeenth Amendment.
Despite the inferences of illegitimacy that arose following the
appointment of Roland Burris, a federal district judge found no legal
103
justification for blocking the appointment. The court held that
“Illinois’ statutory scheme is reasonable; the fact that the circumstances
of this particular appointment have become one of the subjects of a
104
criminal indictment is constitutionally irrelevant.” Although the
Constitution is silent as to selections made under a cloud of
illegitimacy, state legislatures could reform their law to avoid such
situations. Few states, however, have chosen to do so.
ii. The United States Senate’s Failed Attempt to Block Burris’
Appointment
Following his indictment on federal charges, Governor
105
Blagojevich refused to resign from office. The calls for his resignation
106
came quickly from those in both state and federal government.
99

Id.
See Complaint, supra note 2 at 75-76.
101
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
102
Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 934The Seventeenth Amendment states:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures … When
vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments
until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII cl. 1, 2.
103
Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
104
Id.
105
Susan Saulny, Resignation is Rumored; Response is a Firm ‘No’, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2008, at A18, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/us/politics/15illinois.html.
106
Politicians to Blago: Resign, Resign, Resign, NBC CHICAGO (Jan. 10, 2009, 7:58
100
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Ultimately, the Illinois Senate was successful in impeaching the
107
Governor by unanimous vote. However, he still managed to make his
108
appointment to fill the Senate seat prior to impeachment.
In the time between the indictment and impeachment, Senator
Harry Reid (NV), the Senate Majority Leader, wrote the Governor
urging him to resign so that an appointment could be made in a more
109
favorable political climate. Senator Reid also warned that if Governor
Blagojevich were to appoint a replacement before leaving office, the
Senate would prevent that appointee from taking office under the power
vested in Congress by Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 of the United States
110
Constitution. This assertion of power, however, proved to be
111
unfounded, and the Senate was unable to block the appointment.
iii. Valenti v. Rockefeller
In 1968, a class of voters in New York challenged the
constitutionality of a state law that called for the governor to make an
112
appointment to fill a Senate vacancy, followed by a special election.
The plaintiff-voters in Valenti asserted that the law, which was applied
following the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6,
113
1968, violated the Seventeenth Amendment. Given the circumstances,
the court interpreted the statute to mean that “[s]ince this vacancy arose
less than 60 days prior to New York’s regular spring primary in an
AM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/Cries-For-Governors-Resignation-GrowLouder.html. Elected officials calling for Governor Blagojevich’s resignation included: Tom
Cross, Republican Leader of the Illinois House of Representatives; Jack D. Franks and John
A Fritchey, Members of the Illinois House of Representatives; United States Senator Dick
Durbin (IL); Illinois Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn; Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan; and United States Representative Dan Manzullo (IL-16). Id.
107
Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Senate Convicts Blagojevich, Making Him the 1st Illinois
Governor to be Thrown Out of Office, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 30, 2009, at 1.
108
Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Gov. Rod Blagojevich Picks Former Attorney General to
Replace Obama, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune.com
/news/local/chi-blagojevich-burris-senate-31dec31,0,2666580.story.
109
Letter from Senator Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader to Rod Blagojevich,
Governor of Ill. (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/pdfs
/Letter%20to%20Governor%20Blagojevich.pdf.
110
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business…”).
111
Monique Garcia & Jill Zuckman, Senate Lets Burris In, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 13,
2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-burris-13-jan13,0,6205163.story.
112
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
113
Id.
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even-numbered year, under New York Election Law § 296 the vacancy
will be filled at the general election in the next even-numbered year, in
114
this instance November, 1970.” The court went on to authorize the
governor to make a temporary appointment, with that replacement
115
serving until December 1, 1970. In Valenti, the court held that a law
that delayed an election for twenty-nine months was not a violation of
116
the Seventeenth Amendment. This same law, still followed today in
New York, allowed Governor Paterson to appoint Senator Gillibrand to
her position.
The scandal in Illinois in 2008 is probably the most extreme
example of an alleged abuse of power that one could imagine with
regard to the appointment procedure, and still there was no legal
remedy. Meanwhile, the timing of Senator Kennedy’s assassination was
such that under New York law, his replacement was able to serve over
forty percent of a full term before answering to the people of the state in
117
an election. Combined with the power of incumbency and the
numerous questions that could arise over the legitimacy of a governor’s
unchecked action, it is evident that the law employed by forty states is
not sound policy.
IV. THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE WITH SPECIAL
ELECTIONS: THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION
A. The Importance of Full Representation in the United States
Senate
Six states call for a special election to be held in the event a Senate
118
seat is vacated. The length of time that passes between the date the
seat is vacated and the date of the election varies based on the particular
state. Oklahoma and Wisconsin law provide for the shortest possible
119
length of time — thirty and sixty-two days, respectively. These timeframes, however, can easily balloon to eighty or seventy-seven days,
depending on factors like when the secretary of state calls for the
114

Id. at 853.
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 858.
118
ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011).
119
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 12-101; WIS. STAT. ANN. §8.50(2)(a).
115
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120

election. After surveying the current law in the six states, it is
reasonable to conclude that a state that calls for a special election to fill
a Senate vacancy will be underrepresented on Capitol Hill for three to
four months, if not longer. Given the great power that a senator
possesses, a state speaking with half of its voice in the Upper House for
such a prolonged period is unacceptable.
United States Senators are important people. They have unique
powers and responsibilities that Members of the House of
121
Representatives do not posses. The Senate is also the only place in
government where each state has equal representation, regardless of
122
population. It also has fewer members, and as such, each senator’s
vote carries more weight.
While not an exhaustive list, there are four unique powers that
demonstrate the difference between senators and representatives. First,
under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, two-thirds of
the Senate must approve any treaty into which the President wishes to
123
enter. Second, the same section of the Constitution calls on the Senate
to confirm the appointments of members of the Cabinet, federal judges,
124
Ambassadors, and other officials. Third, pursuant to Article I, Section
3, the Senate tries all impeachment proceedings brought against the
President, Vice President, and all other civil officers of the United
125
States. Finally, under Senate Rule 22, senators have the power of the

120

See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §§ 12-101, 103; WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18.
Powers & Procedure, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history
/one_item_and_teasers/powers.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
122
MacGillis, supra note 13.
123
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution states:
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;
and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id.
124
Id.
125
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“[T]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments .... [but] no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds
of the Members present.”).
121
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126

filibuster. This weapon in a senator’s procedural arsenal provides the
legislator with the opportunity to block a vote on a bill by refusing to
127
stop a debate on the Senate floor.
Aside from these unique powers vested in senators, one of the
greatest powers a senator possesses stems from the Connecticut
Compromise. There are only 100 senators, therefore the vote of one
senator represents one percent of the final tally, while the vote of a
representative equates to less than one quarter of one percent of the
House’s final vote. More importantly, the United States Senate is the
only legislative body in the country that is allowed to violate the
principle of “one-person, one-vote,” as necessitated by the Equal
128
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. All states are equal
in the Senate regardless of size; while senators from Wyoming and
California both represent half of their state’s vote in the Senate, there is
an obvious discrepancy in the number of people each lawmaker
represents. Because the Senate treats all states equally, there is no
excuse for a state to be under-represented for three to four months (over
five percent of a senatorial term).
i.

Minnesota 2008-2009

This desire to be fully represented in the Senate was recently
captured — albeit in a different way — in Minnesota. In the November
2008 general election, incumbent Senator Norm Coleman and
challenger Al Franken were locked in a contested election until the end
of June 2009, leaving the state of Minnesota without its second senator
129
for six months. By mid-May, six weeks before Senator Coleman
126
Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
127
Id. Sen. Huey Long (LA) once spent fifteen hours on the floor of the Senate. His
“debate” included recitations of Shakespeare and the reading of recipes for “pot-likkers.”
Sen. J. Strom Thurmond (SC), however, holds the record for the longest filibuster. He set
the record when he spoke out against the Civil Rights Act of 1957 for twenty-four hours and
eighteen minutes. Id.
128
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (holding
unconstitutional a plan where the districts for the lower body of the state legislature were
drawn according to population and the upper body districts drawn geographicallyproportionately); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence,to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person,
one vote.”).
129
Pat Doyle, At Last, a Second Senator for Minnesota, STAR-TRIBUNE (MinneapolisSt. Paul), July 1, 2009 http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/senate/49520987.html.
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finally ended his legal challenge, fifty-four percent of Minnesotans
hoped that Coleman would concede, allowing for the certification of Al
130
Franken as the new Junior Senator from Minnesota. The poll numbers
are notable because Franken received only forty-two percent of the vote
131
in the election. The poll captures the dissatisfaction Minnesotans felt
at being underrepresented in the Senate for one-twelfth of a term.
While six months may seem like a trivial amount of time, the
dispute left Minnesota with just one senator during some of the most
132
trying economic times since the Great Depression. On February 17,
2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and
133
Reinvestment Act, also known as the “Economic Stimulus Bill.” One
of the most important pieces of legislation during the Obama
Administration to date, it was passed just six weeks after the 111th
Congress commenced. The Senate approved the Act on Monday,
February 9, 2009, a mere thirty-seven days after the congressional
134
session began.
While far from a perfect analogy, the speed in which the Senate
was able to pass major legislation is worth noting. Had Minnesota’s seat
simply been vacated on January 3, 2009, the day the 111th Congress
began, under no state law that calls for a special election would a
senator be seated in time for the vote. On the other hand, under a law
that allows the governor to make an appointment, such a selection could
have been made. Even under Wyoming law, which calls for the state
135
political party to make nominations to the governor, the vacancy
would have been filled in a timely manner. In fact, such efficiency has
occurred. In the aforementioned application of the Wyoming law
130

54% in Minnesota Say Coleman Should Concede Senate Race to Franken,
RASMUSSEN REP. (May 19, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content
/politics/general_state_surveys/minnesota/54_in_minnesota_say_coleman_should_concede_
senate_race_to_franken.
131
Kevin Duchschere, Curt Brown & Pam Louwagie, Recount: The Franken-Coleman
Brawl Drags On, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 6, 2008,
http://www.startribune.com/politics/recount/33900844.html.
132
See generally Bruce Bartlett, The Great Depression and The Great Recession,
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/29/depression-recession-gdp-imfmilton-friedman-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlett.html.
133
Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Leaves D.C. to Sign Stimulus Bill, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR20090217
00221.html.
134
David M. Herszenhorn, By Slim Margin, Senate Advances Stimulus Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/washington/10stimulus.html.
135
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011).
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following the death of Senator Thomas, the governor named his
136
replacement just eighteen days after the seat was vacated. In the
present hypothetical, where the seat is vacated on January 3 and the
Senate votes on a bill on February 9, such a law would assure that the
important vote would not be missed, while also safeguarding the
procedures used to fill the vacancy.
While it is true that the Minnesota controversy was the result of a
contested election, as opposed to a vacated seat, this situation illustrates
the importance of being fully represented on Capitol Hill. Although no
state law used to fill a vacancy would leave a state underrepresented for
six months, a three to four month vacancy can be expected if the state
137
selects a replacement through special election. State legislators in the
six states that call for a special election have addressed the goal of
138
maintaining legitimacy in the process, and placing a check on power.
In doing so, however, they have failed to recognize the goal of being
underrepresented in Washington for as short of a time as possible.
ii.

Massachusetts 2009

These concerns of underrepresentation were recently raised in
Massachusetts following the death of Senator Kennedy, a Democrat, on
139
August 25, 2009, after a long bout with brain cancer. In a twist of
irony, Senator Kennedy, a man who had made universal healthcare the
primary cause of his decades-long public career, passed away in the
140
midst of the most meaningful legislative progress on the issue.
Recognizing his own mortality, Senator Kennedy lobbied just five days
before his death for a change in the Massachusetts law governing Senate
141
succession. The law at the time called for a special election 145 to 160
142
days following the date of a vacancy. Kennedy, who served the people

136

Healy & Sittenfeld, supra note 45.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.40.145 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §12-101 (West 2011);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §188.120 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4-9 (West 2010);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-11-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §17.18 (West 2011).
138
Id.
139
John M. Broder, Social Causes Defined Kennedy, Even at the End of a 46-Year
Career in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
08/27/us/politics/27kennedy.html.
140
See Frank Phillips, Kennedy, Looking Ahead, Urges a Quick Filling of Senate Seat,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2009, at 1.
141
Id.
142
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 54, § 140(a) (West 2011); Id.
137
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143

of Massachusetts for forty-seven years in the Senate, realized this law
144
needed to be changed.
Nearly a month after Senator Kennedy’s death, on September 24,
2009, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick signed a bill changing
state law to permit the governor to appoint a replacement before the
145
special election. Later that day, he filled the vacancy in accordance
with that new law, appointing Paul Kirk,a Junior Senator from
146
Massachusetts. At a press conference introducing Kirk as his
appointee, Governor Patrick stated that Kirk “will not seek the open seat
in the special election coming up in January. But for the next few
months, he will carry on the work and the focus of Senator Kennedy,
147
mindful of his mission, and his values, and his love of Massachusetts.”
There are two important takeaways from that statement. First, Patrick
was not seeking to appoint a long-term replacement; rather, he
delegated that matter to the people of Massachusetts in the January 2010
special election. Second, Kirk was to continue fighting for the causes of
Kennedy’s life. The undertone of this statement was clearly that having
two senators in Washington best serves the interests of the people of
Massachusetts. Patrick also realized the importance of party symmetry
when naming a replacement. Full representation in the Upper House is
essential, and to go for a prolonged period with a vacant seat — even
for a few months — is not sound policy.
B.

The Potential for a Contested Special Election

Another danger in requiring a vacancy to be filled through special
election is the potential that the special election could be contested. If a
recount or lengthy court battle ensues, the length of time the people of a
state are represented by just one senator could double or triple. Such a
situation would aggregate the pitfalls discussed in Part IV(A), supra, by
increasing the time of underrepresentation.
Take, for example, a combination of two previously mentioned
scenarios. Minnesotans cast their ballots for the 2008 senatorial race on
143

Martin F. Nolan, Kennedy Dead at 77, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/08/26/kennedy_dead_at_77.
144
Phillips, supra note 140.
145
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 54, § 140; Paul Kirk to Fill Kennedy’s Senate Seat, CNN
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-24/politics/kennedy.replacement_1_
interim-senator-vicki-kennedy-senate-seat?_s=PM:POLITICS.
146
Paul Kirk to Fill Kennedy’s Senate Seat, supra note 145.
147
Id.
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November 4, 2008. Due to the contested election, Al Franken was not
148
declared the winner until July 1, 2009, nearly eight months later. If
this had been a special election, as was the case in Massachusetts
following the death of Sen. Kennedy, where the seat was vacated three
to four months prior to Election Day, the people of Minnesota could
have been represented by only one senator for over a year.
Assume for example that a United States Senator serving the
people of Oklahoma vacates his or her seat. Under Oklahoma law, this
149
vacancy would be filled in fifty to seventy days; with the fifty days
representing the quickest possible turnaround for any of the six states
that call for a special election. Were a contested election of the
magnitude that unfolded in Minnesota in 2008-09 to occur, that seat
would remain vacant for ten to eleven months. These hypothetical
situations demonstrate that some states have sacrificed the goal of full
representation to satisfy goals of checking the governor’s power,
ensuring legitimacy in the process, and having a fair result. The law
proposed in this Note demonstrates that such a sacrifice is unnecessary,
and all four goals are attainable.
V.

A PROPOSED UNIFORM LAW
A.

The Proposal

There is undoubtedly something to be learned from all of the state
laws mentioned thus far. While none of them, standing alone, is without
fault, they all address at least one of the concerns discussed in this Note
regarding a Senate succession law. The forty states that vest the
governor with the power of appointment recognize that going for a
prolonged period of time without full representation in the Senate is not
in the state’s best interest. The six states that call for a special election
realize that the people of the state should ultimately decide who
represents them on Capitol Hill, assuring that the people have faith in
the system. Finally, the laws in Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, and Hawai’i
recognize the national interest in assuring that the balance of power in
the Senate does not shift as the result of a senator’s resignation or death,
150
while at the same time placing a check on the governor’s power.
148

Doyle, supra note 129.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 12-101, 103 (West 2011).
150
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-222 (LexisNexis 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1
(LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22149
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The proposed law herein takes into account the four main policy
considerations that should be balanced when crafting such a law. Those
four goals are: (1) placing a check on power; (2) ensuring legitimacy in
the process; (3) avoiding underrepresentation in the Senate for a
prolonged period of time; and, (4) fairness. While a majority of current
state laws account for one or two of these goals, this proposal accounts
for all four.
With those goals in mind, there are five main features to the
proposed uniform law: (1) assuming the exiting senator is a registered
member of a political party, the governor has the power to make a
temporary appointment, but he or she must choose from a list of three
candidates supplied by the state political party committee of the exiting
senator; (2) if the exiting senator is not a member of a political party,
the state senate should meet to provide three names to the governor for
appointment; (3) neither of these lists can include the governor, as he or
she cannot appoint him- or herself to the seat; (4) the list of candidates
must be submitted to the governor within fifteen days of the vacancy,
and the governor must then make a decision within fifteen days of
receiving the nominees, meaning that the seat will not be vacant for
more than a month; and, (5) a special election will also be called to fill
the remainder of the term, provided that more than thirty months remain
in the term (if less than twenty-eight months remain, the governor’s
151
appointee will serve out the balance of the term).
The interest of being fully represented on Capitol Hill is addressed
by assuring that the seat remains vacant for no less than thirty days. The
interests in fairness and placing a check on the governor’s power are
dealt with by requiring the executive committee of the state political
party of which the exiting senator was a member to nominate three
candidates for the governor’s consideration. Finally, the issue of
legitimacy in the process is tackled by having more people involved in
the selection. The following is a uniform law that encapsulates these

18-111(a)(i) (West 2011).
151
At first blush, allowing an appointee to serve for so long without answering to the
electorate might appear to be in direct contrast with what was previously stated in regard to
the Valenti decision, where New York law called for a similar waiting period after Robert
Kennedy’s death. Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The
difference, however, is that in New York the governor was the sole decision maker. N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011). Under this Note’s proposal, the need for the
electorate to check that decision in a timely manner is mitigated by involving more people
in the appointment process.
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policy considerations:
If a vacancy should occur in the office of United States Senator, it
shall be filled by special election on the day of the next general
election in an even-numbered year, provided that the vacancy
occurred ninety (90) days prior to said election day. If the vacancy
occurred within ninety (90) days of the next general election in an
even-numbered year, then a special election should be called on the
first Tuesday following the first Monday of the next November in an
odd-numbered year. If, however, the vacancy occurred within ninety
(90) days of the next general election in an even-numbered year and
less than twenty-eight (28) months remain in the term of the vacated
United States Senate seat, no special election shall be called. Under
any of the above scenarios, the governor shall be vested with the
power to appoint a qualified candidate to the office of United States
Senate, doing so no more than thirty (30) days after the day of the
vacancy. To facilitate the governor’s appointment, the chairman of
the state political party committee of which the previous incumbent
was a registered member shall meet with members of the state
political party’s board, and they shall nominate three (3) qualified
candidates for the office of United States Senator, and submit that
list to the governor within fifteen (15) days of the vacancy. The party
affiliation of the incumbent shall be determined solely based on what
the previous incumbent had declared on his or her voter registration
card. No other circumstances shall be taken into consideration in
determining the former Senator’s political party affiliation. The
Governor will then be charged with appointing a United States
Senator from the list of the three candidates submitted to the
Governor’s Office. In the event that the incumbent was not affiliated
with any political party registered in the state, the state senate shall
be charged with fulfilling the same duties as would otherwise be
required of the state political party committee with whom the
incumbent had been registered. The state senate, meeting as a whole,
shall nominate three (3) qualified candidates for the office of United
States Senator, and the governor shall fill the vacancy by appointing
one of those three nominated candidates to the office of United
States Senator within thirty (30) days of the date the seat was
vacated. The state senate shall be charged with creating and
enforcing the appropriate legislation governing the procedure in
which the state senate shall meet as a whole and nominate the three
candidates. Under no circumstances shall the governor be allowed to
appoint him- or herself to the vacated United States Senate seat.

B.

The Differences between the Proposal and Current State
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Laws
The proposed uniform legislation adopts more from the laws of
152
Utah, Wyoming, and Hawai’i, than from any of the other states. While
the proposal calls for a special election after the governor has made an
appointment, just like the laws governing Senate succession in the first
153
group of forty states, it also calls for a check on the power the
governor possesses in selecting an appointment. That said, the proposal
is not identical to the law of any state.
i.

Utah

The Senate succession law in Utah reads, in part, that “[t]he
governor shall appoint a person to serve as U.S. senator until the
vacancy is filled by election from one of three persons nominated by the
state central committee of the same political party as the prior
154
officeholder.” The major pitfall of this law is that it does not take into
account the possibility that the people of Utah will elect an independent
to the Senate. Relatedly, the law does not identify how the former
senator’s party affiliation will be determined. It is also possible that,
once in office, a senator will leave his or her political party and then
152
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-18-111(a)(i).
153
ALA. CODE § 36-9-7 (LexisNexis 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-102 (West 2011);
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10720 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 1-12-201 (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-211 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 7321 (West 2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.161 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-542 (West 2011); IDAHO
CODE ANN § 59-910 (West 2011); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (West 2011); IND. CODE
ANN. § 3-13-3-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN § 69.8 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25318 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.200 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1278 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 391 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §
8-602 (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 168.105 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.28 (West 2011); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-855 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.040 (West 2011); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 13-25-202 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-565 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.030 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661:5 (LexisNexis
2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-26 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-14 (LexisNexis
2011); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-12 (West
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-13-08 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3521.02
(West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-20
(2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-16-101 (West 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 204.002,
204.003 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2621 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2207 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.28.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3-10-3 (West 2011).
154
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2)(b).
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either serve as an independent, or join a different party. Utah’s law fails
to foresee any of these situations.
ii.

Wyoming

The proposal more or less mirrors Wyoming’s law as it pertains to
155
how to fill a seat vacated by a senator registered with a political party.
While the Wyoming law also fails to state how the party affiliation of
the former senator will be determined, this is a minor discrepancy. The
biggest problem with the law in Wyoming is the way in which it
instructs the governor to appoint a replacement in the event the former
senator was not registered with a political party.
The governing law in Wyoming states that in the event the former
senator was an independent:
[all of the] state central [party] committees [registered with the
Secretary of State] shall submit to the governor, within fifteen (15)
days after notice of the vacancy, the name of one (1) person qualified
to fill the vacancy. The governor shall also cause to be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the state notice of the vacancy in
office. Qualified persons who do not belong to a party may, within
fifteen (15) days after publication of the vacancy in office, submit a
petition signed by one hundred (100) registered voters, seeking
156
consideration for appointment to the office.

Although the law does successfully place a check on the
governor’s power, more could be done to ensure legitimacy in the
process. Realistically, the governor will care about one nomination and
one nomination only: that of his or her own political party. As a result,
the law runs the risk of falling into the same traps as the current law in
forty states, by giving the governor full discretion to appoint a
157
replacement.
Under this proposed law, having the state senate nominate three
candidates for the governor’s consideration mitigates this potential
pitfall. Although there is no perfect way to deal with independents, the
proposed law would provide more legitimacy to the process by allowing
dozens of elected officials to influence the decision, as opposed to one
elected official and his or her political party. This proposal places a
check on the governor’s power in a way that would reinforce legitimacy
155
156
157

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i).
Id.
E.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42 (McKinney 2011).
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in the process where the Wyoming law falls short.
iii. Hawai’i
Once again, the biggest difference between the proposal and the
governing law in Hawai’i is the way in which a seat is filled when
158
vacated by an independent. Hawai’i law provides: “[i]f the prior
incumbent was not a member of any political party, the governor shall
appoint a person who is not and has not been, for at least six months
immediately prior to the appointment, a member of any political
159
party.” Although it is commendable that the Hawaiian legislature has
recognized the possibility of such a scenario, the law falls short of being
the ideal way to govern the situation.
The first problem with the law is the way in which it improperly
lumps all independents together. While not every Democrat or
Republican will be an ideological copy of another Democrat or
Republican, they generally share common core values. Although there
160
are pro-choice Republicans, and there are Democrats endorsed by the
161
National Rifle Association, as a general principle a voter will be able
to draw many correct conclusions on the politician’s beliefs based on
that politician’s political party affiliation. In the 110th Congress, which
was in session from January 2007 through January 2009, Democrat
Senators voted along party lines on eighty-seven and a half percent of
the issues, while Republican Senators were in line with their party on
162
just over seventy-seven percent of the votes. Senator Olympia Snowe
(ME), a Republican, displayed the least loyalty to her party, but still
158

See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
Id.
160
Current pro-choice Republicans in the Senate include Scott Brown (MA), Susan
Collins (ME), and Olympia Snowe (ME). John Amick, Brown Advocates a Big Tent GOP,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/01/brown-advocatesa-big-tent-gop.html; Susan Collins on Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.
org/social/Susan_Collins_Abortion.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); Olympia Snowe on
Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/social/Olympia_Snowe_Abortion.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
161
In the 2010 midterm elections, the NRA endorsed the Democrat in fifty-eight
contested elections for seats in the House of Representatives. Ben Pershing, Pro-gun
Democrats Win Endorsements from NRA, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/06/AR2010100606329.
html.
162
See The U.S. Congress Votes Database, WASH. POST (2009),
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/110/senate/party-voters
[hereinafter
U.S.
Congress Votes].
159
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toed the party line on sixty-four and a half percent of the votes.
Based on these numbers, it is reasonable to conclude that a senator
from one of the two major political parties will be in agreement with the
party on eight or nine of every ten votes. This ideological uniformity
cannot be assured among members of the public who are not registered
to a political party. Choosing not to be registered Democrat or
Republican does not mean that a person is a member of a distinct third
party with unified beliefs. There are many reasons why a person elects
to be independent, and appointing an unregistered person to fill the
vacancy fails to assure that the balance of power in the Senate will not
shift. In fact, Senators Lieberman (CT) and Sanders (VT), both
independents, voted with the Democrats on roughly eighty-seven
164
percent and ninety-four and a half percent of the issues, respectively.
These two Senators have elected to affiliate with Democrats by
caucusing with the party, but they have chosen not to be registered
members. Despite this, these two senators have displayed more loyalty,
through their votes, to the Democratic Party than the average
165
Republican shows to the GOP.
Under the proposed law, which would call for the state senate to
nominate three candidates, there admittedly could still be an ideological
shift in the Senate. That is to say, if, hypothetically, Senator Sanders
were to leave office and the Vermont Senate was under Republican
control, it would be safe to assume that the state senate would not
nominate someone who would vote with the Democrats on roughly
166
ninety-four and a half percent of the issues. At the same time, under
this proposed law, if Senator Sanders were that devoted to the
Democratic Party he could register as a Democrat and be assured a
Democrat would be appointed to his seat if he were to leave office. By
not being a registered Democrat, however, Senator Sanders has assumed
a certain risk. Although it is possible that this proposal will still give
rise to an ideological shift in the Senate, this raises the second major
problem with the governing law in Hawai’i: if the former senator was
an independent, the governor is once again the sole decision maker,
albeit with the qualification that he or she not allow the appointment of
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. (showing 86.9% (Lieberman) and 94.6% (Sanders), compared with 77.8% for the
average Republican).
166
Id.
164
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167

a Democrat or Republican. Under the law of Hawai’i, this situation
once again opens the door for the potential abuses of power discussed in
Part III, supra.
There is no perfect answer as to how a seat should be filled when
vacated by an independent, and there will inevitably be shortfalls in the
law. Policy decisions can, however, be made. In this situation, the
proposed law places a greater premium on checking the governor’s
power, rather than attempting to assure political ideology replication.
Further, as evidenced by the voting records of Senators Sanders and
Lieberman, attempting to equate one independent with another is a
faulty premise from the beginning. Therefore, the best answer is to
address a policy concern that is redressable, which in this case is placing
a check on the governor’s power of appointment by bringing the state
senate into the process.
C.

Party Identification

Unlike any law currently employed by a state, the proposed law
establishes a way in which a senator’s party affiliation will be
identified. Such a measure is necessary because there are senators who
might be independent, but caucus with a political party, and that
political party might seek to have control over filling that senator’s
vacated seat. It is also possible for a senator to change political party
affiliation while in office. Under the proposed law, the burden would be
on the senator to change his or her voter registration card to reflect
which political party he or she represents. It is a simple and definitive
way to address the issue.
i.

True Independents: Lieberman and Sanders

Senators Lieberman and Sanders are true independents. They ran
as independents in their respective elections and they are not currently
168
registered as a member of a political party. Under my proposal, in the
event that either of these senators were to leave office, the state senate
167

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
Democrats Back Lamont; Lieberman Files for Independent Run, FOX NEWS (Aug. 9,
2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,207516,00.html (it is true that Lieberman was
the Democratic nominee for Vice President in 2000, and ran an unsuccessful primary
campaign for President in 2004. That said, since 2006, he has not been registered with a
political party); Independent Sanders Elected to Senate; Democrat Welch Beats Rainville,
USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2006
/VT/VT.htm.
168
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would be charged with nominating three candidates to the governor.
The fact that both Senators Lieberman and Sanders caucus with the
169
Democrats is irrelevant. Rather, the burden will be on the sitting
senator to assure that his or her successor shares similar political views
by properly identifying him- or herself on a voter registration card. No
other state law adequately addresses how the politician’s party
170
affiliation will be determined.
ii.

A Change of Heart: The Arlen Specter Situation

On April 28, 2009, Senator Arlen Specter (PA) surprised many by
announcing that, after twenty-eight years in office, he was leaving the
171
Republican Party and would run for reelection as a Democrat in 2010.
172
Although not the most conservative of Republicans, the Senator had
173
sought the Republican nomination for President in 1996, so his
174
announcement still came as a surprise. Although Pennsylvania law
calls for the governor to have unchecked power in appointing a
175
replacement, a situation like this would present real consequences
176
under Wyoming and Hawai’i law, as well as under this Note’s
proposal.
If such a situation were to play itself out in Wyoming, and the
senator were then to leave office, the law would call for the Republican
Party to nominate three candidates to fill the seat. Such an inequitable
result is a product of state law, which calls for “the state central
committee of the political party which the last incumbent represented at
the time of his election. . .” to nominate three candidates to the
177
governor. Wyoming law does not adequately take into consideration
the possibility of a senator changing his or her political party affiliation
while in office. While such a change in identification is uncommon, it is
169

Democratic Rifts on Health Care, supra note 41; Kane & Murray, supra note 41.
See supra Part V(B).
171
Paul Kane, Chris Cillizza, & Shailagh Murray, Specter Leaves GOP, Shifting Senate
Balance, WASH. POST, April 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2009/04/28/AR2009042801523.html.
172
U.S. Congress Votes, supra note 162.
173
Arlen Specter, Presidential Announcement (Mar. 30, 1995), available at
http://www.4president.org/speeches/specter1996announcement.htm.
174
Kane, Cillizza, & Murrary, supra note 171.
175
25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2776 (West 2011).
176
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18111(a)(i) (West 2011).
177
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (emphasis added).
170
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not unprecedented. In fact, it has happened three times since 2000.
The Hawai’i law would also fail to answer which party should
nominate three candidates, as it states the governor shall “select [] a
person from a list of three prospective appointees submitted by the same
180
political party as the prior incumbent.” When adopting this new law in
2007, the Hawai’i legislature made the following finding:
[R]equiring the political party of the prior incumbent to provide the
governor with a list of qualified nominees from which to choose
would not unreasonably restrict the pool of qualified candidates for
the vacancy. Rather, such a process would eliminate skepticism and
mistrust and increase public trust and confidence in the appurtenant
181
process.

While these are unquestionably legitimate goals that the legislature
is attempting to reach in its reform, the law would fall short were a
senator from Hawai’i to switch political parties while in office. Rather
than ending skepticism and mistrust, the law would invite additional
drama as political parties fight for the right to nominate three candidates
for the governor’s consideration. However, all is not lost, as the
legislature’s goals are achievable by amending the law once more to
provide for a clear way to identify the former senator’s political party
affiliation.
VI. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION
A.

Changing the State Law

The problem with changing a state law is that it can be changed
again, and as such, the reform process can be abused. Headlines were
made in Massachusetts in 2009, when the state senate reformed its
Senate succession law by allowing Governor Deval Patrick to appoint a
replacement during the 145 to 160 days before the statutorily required
182
special election. As discussed earlier, full representation in the Senate
178

Senators Who Changed Parties During Senate Service (Since 1890), U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_changed_parties.ht
m (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
179
Id. (specifically, James Jeffords (VT), Joseph Lieberman (CT), and Arlen Specter
(PA)).
180
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1.
181
Id.
182
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 54, § 140(a) (West 2011); Matt Viser, Senate OK’s
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is important and a state should attempt to fill the vacancy as soon as
183
possible. Under that theory, the decision by the Massachusetts
legislature was proper and served an important function. The problem
arises when the legislative move is viewed in a historical context, which
shows that it was clearly a misuse of power.
In 2004, Senator John Kerry (MA) was the Democrat nominee for
184
President. At the time, Mitt Romney, a Republican, was the Governor
185
of Massachusetts. Before Senator Kerry won the nomination, the state
law called for the governor to have unchecked power to fill a vacancy in
186
the Senate. With a majority in both chambers of the Massachusetts
Legislature, the Democrats were able to reform the relevant state law,
requiring the aforementioned special election to occur 145 to 160 days
187
after a senator vacates a seat. Thus, had Kerry won, the state
Democrats would have successfully stripped Romney of his
appointment power.
Looking at the way the Democrat-majority Massachusetts
Legislature has reformed the law to their advantage twice in the past
seven years, it is clear that the lawmakers were motivated by a desire to
maintain power, rather than a desire to place a check on the governor’s
decision, or to avoid going underrepresented in Washington. While
avoiding a shift in the balance of power in the Senate is a legitimate
goal, the ends fail to justify the means in this situation. Rather,
Massachusetts lawmakers fostered an environment of illegitimacy and
mistrust in government, as opposed to constructing a law to combat
such concerns.
While there are situations where changing the law would be
advantageous given the current political circumstances, there are other
situations where even the best-intentioned reform will be met with
doubt. Virginia, which is one of the forty states that calls on the
governor to unconditionally appoint a replacement, is a good example

Kennedy Successor Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2009, at 1.
183
See supra Part IV(A).
184
Kerry Accepts Presidential Nomination, CNN (July 30, 2004, 12:56 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/30/fri.hot/index.html.
185
Biography of Willard Mitt Romney, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021300497.
html.
186
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 54, § 140.
187
Viser, supra note 182.
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188

of this. The Old Dominion State is represented in the Senate by Jim
189
Webb and Mark Warner, both Democrats. On November 3, 2009,
190
Robert F. McDonnell, a Republican, was elected Governor. Even if a
well-intentioned Virginia legislator sought to reform the Senate
191
succession law over the next four years, he or she would be met with
cynicism. The state’s political climate will always be gauged by the
legislators and the governor when considering reform, and there are
likely few, if any, situations where a governor would be willing to cede
some of his or her power. At the same time, the legislators who belong
to the same political party as the governor would be unlikely, under
most circumstances, to be motivated to reform the law.
B.

Constitutional Amendment

i. A Difficult Task
Passing a constitutional amendment would foreclose the
opportunity for future reform. The problem, however, is the near
impossibility of getting the amendment ratified. The same problems
previously raised in getting a law passed in an individual state would be
magnified thirty-eight times over in the ratification process.
A constitutional amendment can be proposed by receiving a twothirds majority vote in both the United States House of Representatives
192
and Senate. Even assuming the amendment could get the necessary
support in Congress — which is in no way guaranteed — it must be
193
ratified by thirty-eight state legislatures. Considering only three states
194
(Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i) have analogous state laws, it seems
unlikely that the proposed amendment could gain support of thirty-five
of the remaining forty-seven states during ratification. If this analysis is
wrong, and the amendment could gain such support, then it would
188

E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (West 1993).
Senators of the 112th Congress, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/general
/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm?State=VA (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
190
Rosalind S. Helderman & Anita Kumar, GOP Reclaims Virginia, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/11/03/AR2009110
300371.html.
191
VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-207 (West 2011).
192
The Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov
/federal-register/constitution/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
193
Id.
194
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1 (LexisNexis 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2)
(West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (West 2011).
189
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prevent future abuses of the law. Given that this would cause drastic
change in the laws governing forty-seven states, however, it seems
unlikely that an amendment could garner sufficient support to be
ratified.
ii. Senator Feingold’s Proposal
Former Senator Russ Feingold (WI) agrees that there is a problem
195
with the current law employed by more than four-fifths of the states.
In the midst of the scandal involving Governor Blagojevich, thenSenator Feingold opined that “[w]hat we’ve seen this year is a
disturbing problem and an abuse of this power that suggests this is not
196
the way to go about [filling Senate vacancies].” To that end, Feingold
proposed a constitutional amendment that calls for every state to follow
197
the model of his home state, Wisconsin, and fill a vacant seat in the
Senate by special election, with no power of appointment vested in the
198
governor.
It is first worth noting that the former senator is absolutely correct
in his assessment that there is a problem with the law followed by forty
states. It is encouraging that a lawmaker recognizes the pitfalls in the
policy and is taking action to remedy the problem. That being said,
there are better alternatives than that which Feingold proposes. His
proposal is an oversimplified answer to the task of finding a law that
balances all of the concerns with Senate succession laws heretofore
mentioned. Instead of looking to his own state for guidance on this
issue, Senator Feingold should have looked westward, to the laws of
199
Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i. By modeling his proposal after the law
in those three states, Feingold could reach all four goals of a strong
Senate succession law, as opposed to just three.
VII. CONCLUSION
Forty states have failed to heed John Dalberg-Acton’s warning,

200

195
Emily Friedman, Feingold Seeks Change in Empty Senate Seat Protocol, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6734789.
196
Id.
197
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.18 (West 2011).
198
Friedman, supra note 195.
199
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(2); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-18-111(a)(i).
200
See DALBERG-ACTON, supra note 1 (“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely”).
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instead creating an environment where absolute power can corrupt. As
the legislatures in Wyoming, Utah, and Hawai’i have shown, stripping
the governor of this absolute power is easily attainable. While these
states have all achieved successful reform, all three of these state laws
have potential pitfalls. The law proposed in this Note attempts to close
these loopholes, while never losing sight of the goals of fairness,
placing a check on power, full representation, and maintaining
legitimacy in the process.

